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Introduction
About 65% of the cropped area in India is dependent on 
rains. Because most of the rains in India are received during 
the monsoon months, the crop growing seasons are quite 
short. Any aberrations in the amount of rainfall or in its 
distribution can adversely impact the crop yields. Yield and 
price uncertainties often reduce the incomes of the farm 
households and, consequently, their consumption levels and 
investments. Many of the farmers in the semi-arid tropics 
(SAT) of India live close to subsistence level, and shielding 
them from the weather-induced shocks in agricultural 
income is vital for their survival. The SAT accounts for 37% 
of the country’s geographical area as well as population, 
46% of the net cultivated area, 59% of the coarse cereals 
area, 53% of the pulses area and 60% of the oilseeds area. 
Even 60% of the commercial crops are grown in the SAT. 
If rainfed agriculture in the SAT is to remain as a means of 
livelihood, ex-ante risk management is a critical first step to 
ex-post risk coping.
Weather-related risks are co-variant as they typically impact 
all farm households in the affected region at the same 
time. Local risk sharing arrangements are largely ineffective 
in these situations. When the probability of weather-
related risks is high, farmers diversify and adopt low risk 
and often low return production practices, which involve 
trading expected profits for lower risk. Like in many other 
developing countries, rural financial markets in India are 
fragmented and formal credit markets are, at best, emerging. 
Although credit is an important means of consumption 
smoothing, it tends to be complimented by an array of other 
ex-post risk coping strategies, such as asset sales, remittances 
from family members and other risk-sharing arrangements. 
When many farmers are in distress and seek to liquidate 
assets, their prices are likely to fall, making it hard for 
affected families to smooth consumption and to recover 
from the stress in the future.
Households can also reduce their exposure to weather risk 
ex-ante. This could occur through precautionary saving, 
or by income smoothing strategies such as implementing 
more conservative agricultural production strategies. In 
fact, rainfed farmers were earlier focusing on low risk food 
crops to keep down risks although it meant sacrificing high 
expected returns from cash crops such as cotton, castor, 
vegetables, among others. But over the years, the returns 
from food crops such as millet and sorghum declined 
rapidly due to declining demand and falling prices. Farmers 
increasingly shifted to cash crops as their incomes from non-
farm sources and seasonal migration enabled them to accept 
higher risks. However, in the absence of effective income-
smoothing measures during drought, farmers often fall short 
of their consumption needs, leading to chronic indebtedness 
and, in some cases, even to desperation and suicide. In 
the absence of risk insurance, traditional ex-ante risk 
management strategies and ineffective ex-post risk coping 
systems lock the SAT farmers in poverty and subsistence 
production. Insurance is one of the important ex-post risk 
reduction strategies (Figure ).
Impact of government policies on 
rainfed farmers
Several policies pursued by union and state governments 
over the last four decades have inadvertently favored 
irrigated agriculture and impacted rainfed agriculture 
adversely (Table ).
The impact of the Green Revolution was far stronger on 
those with access to irrigation. The productivity growth 
for irrigated crops was matched by growth in consumption 
demand stimulated by the public distribution system. 
The farmers with irrigation facilities also benefited from 
a far higher level of input subsidies relative to those who 
did not have them (Figure 2). Thus, the march to self-
sufficiency entailed huge subsidies on food and agricultural 
inputs and benefited the farmers with access to irrigation 
but rendered the farmers without access to irrigation non-
competitive. Farmers whose production was largely insulated 
from weather aberrations benefited heavily from the input 
Figure 1. Sources of risk, effects and strategies of farmers.
insurance, where 
the insurer covers 
a percentage of 
the loan for annual 
cultivation expenses 
of the participant 
farmer. The yields 
are assessed by 
conducting a 
few crop-cutting 
experiments 
randomly. With 
many small farmers subscribing to insurance through 
institutional sources of credit, it would be a very costly 
process to implement the crop loan insurance with village 
or individual farmers as the unit of insurance. So, the unit 
of insurance was taken as a tehsil (about 50 villages) or 
mandal (about 20 villages) and indemnities were paid if the 
average yields in the specified area fell below the assured 
yield levels. This scheme, in recent years, threw open the 
participation to non-borrowers and extended it to several 
non-food crops and horticultural plantations. However, the 
insurance premiums are closer to 
actuarial rates in case of the cash 
crops while they are still far below 
the actuarial rates in case of food 
grain crops and oilseeds.
As the crop loan insurance is 
largely tied to the institutional 
loans, it benefited the farmers 
with irrigation to a large extent. 
The financial institutions consider 
lending to rainfed farmers as a 
non-viable proposition. Ulrich 
Hess (2003) conceptualized a 
diagram depicting the decision 
criterion of the bankers (Figure 3). 
Over the period of implementation 
of the Comprehensive Crop 
Insurance Scheme, the indemnities 
paid out were about five times 
the premiums collected. Between 
985/86 and 999, the premiums 
collected totaled up to Rs 4028 
Figure 2. Subsidies per hectare in AP 
agriculture, 2002–03.
Table 1. Adverse effects of policies on rainfed agriculture and suggestions for correcting the policy bias.
Policy Intended impact Adverse consequence How to correct the policy bias 
1.  Minimum support prices backed 
up by selective procurement (of 
only rice and wheat)
Encourage farmers produce 
more without the fear of price 
risk
Prices of rainfed crops fell relative 
to those of rice and wheat
Extending procurement support to 
rainfed crops
2.  Supply of wheat and rice at a 
subsidy in the PDS
Improve the economic 
access of resources for poor 
consumers food grains 
Distortion of price ratios and 
hastening of substitution of 
coarse grains by rice and wheat
Food stamps in place of PDS
3.  Providing subsidies to key inputs 
such as fertilizers, irrigation water 
and power
Encourage farmers to adopt 
improved technologies and 
to produce more 
Rendered rainfed farming 
non-competitive due to higher 
subsidies for irrigated farms
Targeting more investments and 
subsidies to rainfed areas and crops
4.  Crop loan insurance schemes Protect farmers from 
shortfalls in income
Coverage only for irrigated farms 
due to higher intake of credit
Introduction of subsidized rainfall 
insurance schemes for rainfed areas
subsidies and remained in the vanguard of Green Revolution. 
Those who were exposed to all the vagaries of weather 
hardly benefited from the input and food subsidies, and were 
largely bypassed by the Green Revolution. Certainly the 
distribution of income between the farmers with irrigation 
facilities and those without irrigation has become more 
unequal and adverse. The net impact of all the well-meaning 
policies for the agricultural sector has resulted in the non-
viability of rainfed agriculture. Evidence from the ICRISAT 
village level studies (VLS) suggests that the farmers from 
Mahabubnagar, Akola and Solapur districts in India failed to 
recover even the variable costs from their rainfed crops while 
they were able to recover all the costs from the irrigated 
crops (Table 2). 
Crop insurance
Crop insurance is a major public policy designed to get to the 
source of the problem of yield variability. It is a contingency 
contract where participant farmers pay premium and collect 
indemnities when yields fall below an insured level. In India, 
crop insurance was introduced in the mid-980s as crop loan 
Sources of risk
Variability in quantum and distribution of 
rainfall, changes in the prices of inputs 
and outputs, use of risky technologies
Effects of risk
Reduced yields (or crop failures), profits 
and incomes; loss of employment; 
indebtedness and migration
Ex-ante 
strategies
Choice of low return–low 
risk crops, mix of enterprises 
whose returns are negatively 
correlated, conservative 
use of inputs, 
precautionary 
saving
Ex-post 
strategies
Informal: Mutual help, 
social networks, sale of  
assets, migration
Formal: Supply of 
consumption credit, 
insurance 
coverage
million, while the indemnities paid amounted to Rs. 23050 
million (Table 3). More than 55% of the indemnities were 
paid to farmers in Gujarat alone. The loss ratio was nearly 
2 for Gujarat, while it was only about 6 at the all India 
level. Yet the farmers were not satisfied with it due to lack of 
transparency.
Rainfall insurance
Research carried out through the ICRISAT VLS suggested 
that rainfall lotteries are better than the crop insurance 
schemes (Table 4) to diminish rural household income 
variability in a cost-effective manner in rainfed areas of 
India (Walker and Ryan 990). They would be a fair betting 
system and would be open to all households in the village. 
For instance, if landless labor households felt the demand for 
their labor was markedly reduced in low rainfall years, they 
could hedge their future labor income by purchasing tickets 
on the lowest or what they perceive to be the most adverse 
rainfall event. Rainfall may explain more of the variations in 
Figure 3. Bank perception of crop loan risk.
Table 2. Relative profitability of irrigated and rainfed crops 
in VLS villages, 2001-04.
Village District (State) Crop
Returns to land and 
management 
(Rs/Hectare)
Aurepalle Mahabubnagar 
(AP)
Sorghum
Paddy
–997.3
3188.1
Dokur Mahabubnagar 
(AP)
Castor
Paddy
–813.8
3105.2
Kalman Solapur 
(Maharashtra)
Rabi Sorghum
Sugarcane
–128.5
3189.4
Shirapur Solapur 
(Maharashtra)
Rabi Sorghum
Sugarcane
–1179.9
4187.4
Kinkheda Akola 
(Maharashtra)
Cotton
Wheat
–627.5
1254.0
Kanzara Akola 
(Maharashtra)
Sorghum
Wheat
116.1
774.7
Table 3. State wise premium and claims: origin and 
destination (1985/6–1999).
State
Premium Claims
Loss 
ratio
Million 
rupees
Share 
(%)
Million 
rupees
Share 
(%)
Gujarat 644.5 16 13369.3 58 20.74
Maharashtra 604.2 15 2533.3 11 4.19
Andhra Pradesh 1007.0 25 3227.0 14 3.20
Others* 1772.4 44 3918.6 17 2.21
All India 4028.1 100 23050.4 100 5.72
*Others include 22 states and UT’s excluding Punjab, Haryana and 
North-Eastern states
crop revenue when compared with the pure impact of yield 
variability as it also influences the area sown.
The ICICI–Lombard General Insurance Company Limited 
is the pioneer in designing rainfall insurance products 
and marketing them through banking and non-banking 
financial institutions in India. They sold rainfall insurance 
products for the first time to 48 farmers in a few villages 
in Mahabubnagar district of Andhra Pradesh State during 
2003–04 through Krishna Beema Samruddhi (KBS) local 
area bank. They refined the products in 2004–05 and sold 
them to 35 farmers in 43 villages of Mahabubnagar and 
Anantapur districts targeting them to castor and groundnut 
farmers. The trigger levels and indemnity payments were 
worked out on an actuarial basis. ICICI-Lombard could 
purchase reinsurance from international insurers for 
the products based on the rainfall distribution at India 
Meteorological Department (IMD) stations. ICICI-Lombard 
made some more changes to the products during the 2005–
06 season, and introduced the concept of Policy Activation 
Rainfall, which is linked to the onset of the monsoon. The 
policy gets activated when the cumulative rainfall after  
June reaches 50 mm, and the first phase commences. This 
process of refining the products may continue for some time 
before they are standardized. The Agricultural Insurance 
Company of India Limited also introduced the ‘Varsha Bima’ 
pilot scheme during kharif (rainy season) 2004. Farmers 
are slowly learning to deal with these constantly changing 
products. As can be expected, the demand for these rainfall 
insurance products is higher in the villages where farmers 
received payouts in the previous year. 
Subsidizing rainfall insurance
Both the Government of India as well as some state 
governments have shown considerable interest in the 
rainfall insurance scheme and are discussing possibilities of 
a national or state coverage with ICICI-Lombard. During 
2004–05, the rainfall insurance products were also marketed 
through VELUGU (a semi-government agency in Andhra 
Pradesh working for eradication of poverty), besides BASIX, 
in Hindupur area of Anantapur district. VELUGU could 
sell the products by extending the period of sale. Rainfall 
insurance policies are also being sold under the ‘Varsha Bima 
Yojana’ scheme of Agricultural Insurance Corporation. With 
the involvement of government agencies, it is a matter of 
time that the premiums of the rainfall insurance products 
4will be subsidized either based on income criterion or 
size group criterion. Just as the insurance premiums 
were subsidized directly to small and marginal farmers 
or indirectly by fixing low premium (much lower than 
the actuarial rates) to food grain and oilseed crops in the 
National Agricultural Insurance Scheme, the premiums of 
rainfall insurance products may also be subsidized to an 
extent of 50 to 80% in the schemes administered through 
the government organizations. The shift from crop loan 
insurance to rainfall insurance might be desirable 
as it is transparent and cost effective (Table 4).
Policy implications 
How can rainfall insurance help rainfed farmers? 
The facts presented in this Brief imply viable 
policy initiatives to help rainfed farmers face risks 
inherent in rainfed agriculture. Rainfed farmers 
have very little access to institutional credit as they 
are subjected to credit rationing by the institutions 
due to perceived high risks. Hence they do not 
get much cover from the National Agricultural 
Insurance Scheme (NAIS), which focuses 
primarily on crop loan insurance. Well-designed 
rainfall insurance products can attract rainfed 
farmers to buy the policies and get adequate 
insurance coverage. At the moment, while the 
NAIS charges lower premium than the actuarial 
levels (particularly in the case of food crops and 
oilseeds), the rainfall insurance premiums charged 
by the ICICI Lombard or Agricultural Insurance 
Company of India are actuarial. The difference 
creates a disincentive to rainfed farmers, resulting 
in slow uptake rates. There is a compelling 
justification for subsidizing the premium for 
rainfall insurance products so that they get a level 
playing field in matters of insurance. To introduce 
the rainfall insurance concept to a wider clientele 
of smallholders, institutional arrangements 
facilitated by pilot programs can show how best 
insurance schemes benefit them. It can also 
feature the benefits to a wide range of beneficiaries 
including landless households and small producers 
in the rainfed regions. Ultimately, a well designed 
and appropriately subsidized rainfall insurance 
scheme will enhance the uptake rates and will 
improve the safety net against weather-induced 
risks, especially among the marginalized population 
who are dependent on rains for their livelihoods. 
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Table 4. Crop loan insurance vis-à-vis rainfall insurance: 
a comparison of merits and demerits.
Crop loan Insurance Rainfall Insurance
Merits Demerits 
Farmers can obtain cover against yield 
loss as the payments of indemnities are 
based on insured yield levels
There is no one to one correspondence 
between the quantum of rainfall and 
yield of the crop
When the distance of the rainfall 
recording station from their farms 
is farther, the chance of getting a 
meaningful insurance cover is less
Demerits Merits 
Coverage mostly available for irrigated 
farms due to higher absorption of credit 
by them
Good scope for covering the rainfed 
areas
Practically limited to borrowers from 
financial institutions
It can be purchased by any one (both 
non-borrowers and borrowers)
Yield loss is estimated based on a few 
crop cutting experiments 
It is based on rainfall received at the 
IMD/mandal rain gauges
It is not transparent It is transparent and easily verifiable 
Farmers benefit indirectly from the 
indemnities paid
The purchaser gets the benefit of 
indemnities directly
Premium rates are actuarial for 
commercial crops while they are much 
lower than the actuarial rates for food 
crops 
Premium rates are actuarial based on 
the quantum and distribution of rainfall
The problem of moral hazard is quite 
serious
The problem of moral hazard is 
eliminated due to transparency and 
easy access to rainfall data
High social costs involved in assessing 
the yields as some of the costs are 
absorbed by government departments
The cost of recording and publishing 
the rainfall data is quite moderate and 
affordable
Problem of adverse selection as the 
farmers tend to take insurance cover 
more for the crops with low premiums 
and in areas with higher risk
These problems of adverse selection 
are non-existent as the premiums 
are based on the rainfall data at the 
nearest rain gauge
The time taken for settling the 
indemnities is more than one year 
It takes only two months to settle the 
indemnities
Cannot be extended to non-farmers Can be extended to non-farmers such 
as shopkeepers, agri-processing units, 
agricultural labor, among others 
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